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CIIAPTIJR. IV.
What is

the True Doctrine?

I.

C}HAPTEIi

The Charactor and Scope of tho Inquiry.

The subject which this article

cUSFCs

involves a

question which has not been directly raisedt before the courts
with much frequency.

If the amount of litigation is the

measure of imrortance, , az it

is

alt to be considercd in

these

then the writ-

times when every one is so intelsely pactical,

er's choice of a subject may be criticisd as bein- one of
not very -reat Irctical value.
found, uron reflection,

But this criticism, 7ill be

to be 7o :ewh t unjust and superficial.

The infrequency of litigation on the subject is
to the fact that th re hf,

been a hesitancy in

to adopt the English doctrine,

due chiefly0

this country

and answer the question af-

firmat ively.
7hether practical or not, howove",
which able jurists

lilke Lor-

Camibell,

a question upon

Lord Justice Brett,

,4

Lore Selborne,

?3>r.

Justice CroarLton anw

rrIA on the one side,

'have C'iffered from 1dr. Justice Coleridge and Lord Chief Justice Coleridge on the othor hand,

and' concernin- which the

higlest courts of various states Aiave -ocahed diro-tly opposite conclusions, must indcoed be a close and interesting
one,

is

the study of which cannot be entirely without rrofit.
the
1ut writer ventures to suEZest that the quection

a very yractical one; one,

in fact, which vitally concerns

both the commercial and the labor interests of our country.
This would be quickly :'-oticable if

the answer was universally

in the affirmative,

on account of the litigation which it

would give risc to,

and the litr itations which it

would place

upon the freedom which now reons coiy: ar tively undisturbed
in the commercial world; and because the souhdest and best
authorities,

as the writer attempts hcrcinto

answered the question in the nerativc,

show,

have

and thus protected

that commercial freedom from unwise restraint, shall nvo say
that the queption is any the less -ractical?
A zv.or-l also as to the score of this article.

The

limits set by custom uron simaia- ". '-o'uctions forbid the
discussion he-rein of' the very live tor-its of the legality of

-5-

strikes and boycotts.

But the question here discussed

arises, and should be rightly determined, before one enters
that domain of legal conrtroversy.

The fact that this is so

is emphasized by the ill-adviseo, dicta which are to be found
frequently in judicial opiilons rendered in c3.Se5
of such labor t-ouble.

arising out

The latest and most -m'oainent illus-

tration of this is to be found in the recent opinion

of Un-

ited States Circuit Judge ?ift, in the Ann Ar Jor Railroad
strike case, which decision created great

Curore in labor

cireles and has been the subject of much newspaper comment.
In the course of his opinion (See 54 Fed.IRep.,

730, at page 740)

after referring briefly to the English cases and the M1assachusetts case, which it is attempted to show herein are not
based upon sound yrinciples of law, and to the t; o Eew York
cases--- which are shown herein to be not in point at all --Judge Taft says,-

"If a person, with rights secured by contrw t

may, in case of loss, recover d-mages from one not a -ar

to

the contract, who, with intent to injure him, ino.uces a
breach of it,

a fortiori

cq one whose r-ights are secured

by statute recover damages from a -:ersonwho, with intent to
injure him, procures the violltion of those rights by another

-C-

and causes loss. "

Ey way of yareinthepis,

that the real intent ---

it

-Light be noted

the T-riT. ry L.oti 7e --- of the strih:-

ing engineers, vfms not to injureany one, but instead it vwas
a noble and philanthropic Turrose to benefit their fellowengineers by enabling ther t- obtain better compensation for
their labor.

Had Judge Taft carefully investigated all the

authorities both pro and con, it is safe to yre-ict that he
would not have made this statement re-ara'in. the existence of
a right of action for malicious interference with contract at
com.on law.

As the case which he was considering arose under

the statute known as the Intrr-state Commerce la.:, the above

statement may be dismissed as a mere dictum.

But it suffices

to illustrate the necessity of a correct us-dersta ding of the
principle involved, for incorrect dicta are often a source
of imuch annoyance, and are liable to Irove dangerous stumbling
blocks in future ,ears.
It will thus be seen that it is the purpose of this
discussion to lead up to, but not across, the threshhold of
the labor problems.

And it is only after this precefing in-

quiry is properly answerea, that one is -repared to enter upon
an intelligent consideration of the legal que :tions :,hich
labor disturbances give

rise to.

CHAPTER

II.

The Origin and Extent of the En-lish Doctrine.

In the year of our Lord, the one thousand eight
hundred anid fifty-first,

arid of the reign of her Gracious

Majesty, Queen Victoria, the fourtenth, there lived in the
city of Londo.,

England,

a Good and loyal subject bearing the

name of Benjbmin Lumley.

Mr.Lumley wia s the lessee and pro-

-prietor of her 1:ajesty'e Theatre, in the said city of London,
wherein ho caused to be rroduced from time to time,
tainments of ar

In

from which

eleva<ting and ennobling nature,

his patrons derived g,eat pleas-ure,

enter-

and 7imself great profit.

order to add to both the rleasure and the yrofit, in Novem-

b-r, 1851, he entered into an c...o ementwith 1iademoisellc
Johanna Wagner,

of Berlin,

cantatriee to the Court of His

Majesty, the King of Prussia. and a singer of evident great
renown,

by which she bound herself to sin- at her :Jajesty's

Theatre in

Loneon for three ::onths forom Aril

1,

1852, for the

-C--

and
4t-,l1nc
ijc:r ':onth,

modest remuneration of 400 -7ounch
further agreed

that during sai.

talents at any other t-(t-c

or concert without tte express

-r Lumley.

consent of

But there vrac in te"

London anothur theatre,

a. t'.o Covent
a-io;:

the proprietcr of w:hich Y-as

it

would

7-o.r
grieve

sing :t

groeat city of

C-arden Theatre,

Gyc.
o

Th-edcc

,ir.

the notion that it

somehow conceive,
have :1iss

time she uould 1-ot use her

h.

Gye

would. be a nice thing to

his theatre,

or,

at any rate,

his soul to have his business rival,

Lurley,

'
"iz-A
orct of wealth because

So he, with fI(

Jx-

a deliberate

of

le-

rin:d

L.

talents.

c cxisting contract,

-oour.ose
injure his rIvoK

that

and with

better himself,

made the t-'irndonna a better- offer to come and sing at his
theatre instead of :at l-r Lumlcy'.
necessity philanthrojhists,
ing for lucre as w

Atc

ti-.-:

and as the ILademoiscllc was sing-

a Eellfor faic, she accepted. the -ro-oos itiCR

deliber.tely brohe her contract with Li2rley,
to delight the o.

are :ot of

iences at the Covert
n

the rare and exquisite richness of

and proceeded

ar den Theatre with
uer aelodious voice.

Mr Lumley felt

that he had been deeply w,--onged,

11iss YVager'
e

notes did not

and although

r:ing thCcvv-'h the arches of his

-0-

air all ',bout there, never-

theatre,

there was -iiisic in

thelec.s,

for he forthvith cau7ed
c

'huimso

ie courts of justice to

to senalh,in his efforts to rrotect his rights and rei

And out of the

w,'oigs.

there arose tv-c
In

t,,,

;hich followed

.....e t leadiuc cases in English jurisprudence.

one of them,

of equity vill

iti-ation

the doctrine
by ]-e.*. .' ci

;.s established that a court
-nuction

restrain the breach

of a contract for personal services, contining bot- a -ositive and a negativoagreemnnt., even though it cannot enforce
the specific :crformance of the entire contract.
Wagner,

(Lumley v.

I Dcg.M.& G. , 601. )
Iraving obtained such an injunction

Miss Y'ager from singing at the

coment.

restraining

Garden Theater,

and

enjoining Gye not to employ her there, Lumley next turned his
attentLion T ore atcl
attention
earticularly
of law. to recover da .ages
vith the contract tha:t
and Miss Wagner,

on Gye,

and sued him in

a court

for -ais malicil.,s interference
- ben "...a

and for Llaliciosly

betwveen himself (L-tmley)
enticing and procuring

her to brea2- such contract.

Gye deiru.

ration on the ground tia-t tho

' ,ts stated did not constitute

a sufficient

cause of action,

to Luley'

decla-

but upon the 2-r.-,ment of such

- l-

demurer-t,
the court of Queen's 3enc_ overr1leda the s ame, and
interfoence with a contra:t was ai

held that m
aetion:uble w::ron-.
It

(Lul 2.

2 1llis & 31acKburn,216)

Gye,

the doctr ine lai! dowu for the first

is

which it

case,

the purpose of this article to consider.

is

As this case is

thcrefore the corner stone upon which we

shall either erect our mv-!o.'
the renedy ther'efor,
upon because it

ti-e in the latter

and

a- "uin- unfit to build

or else rejct

iaid in the quicrlssa.ds of false and erron-

is

neither

eous reas onin-,

tructure of a legal wron

time nor s-ace can be deemed

miss-ent which is d- oted to ex.inirc somewhat at ieigth
the ratio decidendi of t-Kt case.
Lumley v.

(
alreadvy intimat u,
a

Gyc,

the first impression.

it

w s concede

right of arction had fo:'

LDg

a master against a

woo enticed
0eion

here the coon

sel

legal

7,3s

of the

ut

npathlw
,y ii

the right one.

that the
-0fcn< iill1

which had becowio ongrefe

on both sides that a

t
tizo
existed in favor of

went in different dircetions,

that his roa-

was a case of

-

,

v.ay his servant.

and the o::-osing coun-

each,
It

But

of course,

asserting

was urged on the part

was an anomalous one,

u .on the l:

ii

the days of slavery,

L

-.

when the servant was considered the 7y-roperty of the master,
and that it

should not be enlarged,

but should be confined to

those cases in which the strict relation of' master and servant
existed,

and was not

artiste.

On the other hand,

ter's

of actico

ri-hl

it

was contended t'at the mas'o

above alidej

the general rule. Iaid don:r Ccryr'sLi

(A),

that "i-n al

case ,

-.i

.ircd

the malicious

was but a
cst,

branch of

Action on the Case

cre man has tempor-l loss or dam-

age by the wrong of another,
case to

of a cT-matic

to the ca

A."I'licable

he may have an action on the

I,±n Cd-l.ges" " and that a:-i,--

thiat principle

s-X intentional yrocurement of the bracli of any

contract was an injury for which a cause of action would lie.
'7hile a majority of the court decided in favor of the plaintiff,

they diffe(2C. snerenhat as to t:ie ba-is of the decision,

and each one w;rote a-i opinion.

Crompton J., held that the

principle of giving a cause of action for enticing away a
oeendant malic-

servant was a-iclicable to a case where the
iously procures a party under contract
personal sevice for a specified tisic,

to render exclusive
As
liss Ya-ner,

as w

refuse to -ive such service; but he declined
broader doctrine that a-

action would lie

to holf the

for malicious in-

to

-1.-

terference with any conract, as being unnecessary to the
decision of the case, althou-"A ho c-idonce'2 a stron
in favor of that view.

Erle J.,

leaning

too'k 'he broad vie..: that

"he who jrocures maliciously a (flmagc.to another by a violation of hic right, ought tc be made to indernxiify; and that
whether he -roourcs an actiona,)le won-, or a breach of con-

tract."

position about midway between

i7'1tmana

the other two, and in favor of' the 1laintiff.

But Sir John

Coleridge, J. wrote a very strong, able, and learned disseriting ozinion, which has been much admired, and the reasonin;, of Ycrich seems to the rresent writer to be conclusively
convincing.

Ile maintainedr

general rule of lax7 tint
is

with ,reat force that

it was a

thne remedy for breach of contract

confined to the contracting parties;

into the contr°act with that

that the parties enter

ndr'tthat

as man is

a

free moral agent, the broach of contract is the act, not of
the third -party, but of the party to the contract hirself;
that an intcr.-f.ernce x.ith the contract if
is

concedcdly rnot actionable;

and thAtt

not malicious,
'to draw a line be-

tween -;.dvice, persuasion, enticement and p-rocurement is practical:-

i:;possible in

a court of justicc;

wlho shall say how

-13-

Tmuch of a free agents resolution flows from the interference
of other 11inOs, or tic iflriT:JILVnt resoluti~n )f his own?
This is

a matter for the co suist rathcr t1han ta

less is it for the juryman."

is

still

He then goes on to :oint out

that the right of action by t
servant

jurist;

acastor
s:t
to
fo

£'::ay his

<1iei"

an admitted exception Io the above rule, which had

its origin in the fa-mous historical Statute of Laborers, passed in 1349, in the twenty-hird
the Thir.

year of the reigh of Edrand

This statute was enacted in consequence of the

great mortI-,?ty vhich 7revailed -m-ong the low,.,er classes on
account of the ravages of the Dlach De th, with the result of
producing a great acarcity of menial labor.

This occurred

during the transition period from serfdora to free labor, and
the statute had a most important bearing on the great social
revolution which ;as then in Iyrog-ess.
of the English People, Vol.
of Laborers it,-elf

(See Green's History

p. 405 Ct seq.)
7.,
one who

(-ads

t

The Statute
iowI

in

this

day of freedom, as a most tyrannical and opressive measure;
and is a strilking land uaa

of the harriers which have been

placed from time to time in

the 1;ath-.>iy of -- ogress and en-

lightened freedom.

in

the prcabplc to the statute it

is

said:

-14-

c.:.d great scarcity

"Many seeing the necessity of masters,

of servants, will not serve unless they may receive excessive
wages, and somie rather beg in idlenless,

thl:

by labor to get

their living; we considering the grieveous incommodities,
whtch of the lack especially of plou-hmen and of such laborers
may hereaCter come,

have orained,," etc.

It was then en-

acted that "every man and woman, of whatsoever condition,
free or bond, able in

not having of 'As own whereof he

years ------------------may live,

body, and vithnin the age of three score

nor lands of his own about the tillage of which he

may occupy hi.self, and not serving ar:y other, shall be
bound to serve the employer waho shall require him to do so,
and shall take only the uages which were accustomed to be
taken in

the neighborhood where he is

years before the plague began.
yunishable by imyrisorz.ent,

It

for arn

bound to serve" two

was further made an offeirg
M170,"

reaer,

or other

laborer or servant to depart from service before the expiration of the time of service a-reed on; and no one is
ceive or retain,

to re-

any such offender in his service under like

pain of imrisonment.
Aftor recounting this Statute,

Judge Coleridge by

-15-

4
c~~rcft'J.~~~

-r,,i1~
~( W::,r.v

ti

reafter goes

on to shwc: that this statute W-.rv the fondtion ,f the action
for the enticin- away of a

, ant ;

hir-o

.nd roaches the

conclusion that such right of action, being a-, excertion to
the zeneral rule of la.vz, sho'~id be li'aitcd rathor than extendBut Judge
to the c:lse at bar.
ed, and '~mas not aprllcaDblo
was a-ftero all onily a "issenting one,
Colegels able oi4on
so the demurrer was overrulec,
plead,

the defendant was allowed to

and. the case went to trial.

The doctrine of law thus
eriously questioned., but

established by th> cage w:s ver y

as the defendant :'ecove-'da ver'-tict uiron the t-ial (see Smith's
Lea.dling Cases,

8ti Ef.,

Vol.

1.,

5:.

08) there was no or-or-

of
Court
the ease to the 4,to
tuTity for carrying
°
0,.
highestO~i

ror,

and the

uyron the -rorositon could not be obtained.

highest aithrity

After a lapse of nearly three decadehs, however, thIe
doctrine of Lurley v. Gyo, c me up squarely for eonsideration
L.R.
in Boe v.
in 1881, in the Court of A 1a.
Q.B.Div.,

333.

workman, who,

This was an action for
ith a fc

for manufacturin
the -ilaintif for

others,

eading a s:illed
a secret rrocs

:lazed bric::s, to brao): his contract wit"h
se-vice for 2ive years.
-clusivc

The

-13-

decision in Lurley v. Gyc, it v:ill be noticcd, ritcd upon two
propoitions, viz.'(I)

That & -I

1-1

will iic for the procuring the

breach of any contract, when t. ,siC is done with a malicious
intent;
(2)

That the exce-tional rule a-plica-ble to contracts

between master and servant was equally xoli

)e

to any con-

tract for personal services; although the majority of the

-.7

court leaned more strongly on the second proposition than on
the first.

Thit

the second anr-

ii Dovrn vs. -1a.11,

tc-

3ourt repudiated

-'oi
.cqle as the basis of

ado-jted the first

its decision, and laid down the broad :octrine that a man who
induces cue of' two rarties tc a contract to bred- it, intending thereby to injure the other, does that other a:- actionable wrong.

Particilar strss is iaid on thle point that to

be actionable,

tl:e

:nterfcoence

of the second Irowosition,

mist be malicious.

Brett,

J.

in effect that MIr. Justice Coler:1-e
that the riastr
based ':on

act"

f.:-

2

'ioi

in
7.-.7

1owe>. v.

o

Hall,

states

right in maintaining
_

t-.e StAt'ite of' Laorers, and should

ed, and adds that "if, in orThr

Speaing

servant was
not be c::tend-

.. ort Lumley v.

Gyc,

-17

it

had boon necessary to aec-t this (s-econd)

we should have much Coubted.,
But we thinh the case is
Ir

larger doctrine.
sentin~;g oninion,
eridge,

to say

better

Bowen vr.

m

1L,' J ast.----------------

ort.'n

upon the first

Hall there was also a

and the judge who wrote it

being none other than the Right Hon.

Coleridge,

:frolosition,

and
'is-

s also a ColJohn DuL-ne,

Lord

the then and now Lord'L Chief Justice of England.

With great fo-er

he lays dovn the doctrine that

alearnoss,

uu

"an action does not and ought not to lie against a third person for maliciously and injuriously enticing and procuring
another to break a contract in a case where the relation of
master and servant in a strict sense d -oes not exist.,'
then goes on to say,-

It

ls I believe admitted that if a man

maliciously endeavors to persuade another to break
but fails

in

nis endeavor,

the malicious motive is

that if

a cdntrac%
not in

it is, I believe, also admitted

itself a cause of action.
-------

He

a man enreavors to *ersuade another to

break his contract and succee(s in his endeavor, yet if he
does this without what the lw calls'malice'
result% however great,

is

iot

in

itref'

the damage which

a cuIse of action;

I mean, of course, a cause of action- against him.

But if

the damage which is not in itself actionable be joined to a
motive

which is not in itself actionable, the two together
a straige conclusion."

This scnu

form a cause of action.

Then after meeting the arrrnments that the actions for libel
and conspiracy are analogous to this by showing that in each
of these cases there is a aronjful act as well as a malicious
motive he adds,v.

Gye,

that it

"I do not know,exc ?t ln the case of Lumley
has e-rer bee:

h-lelK' tf

t

conduct of the same

person for doing the same thing under the same circumstances
with the same result is actionable Dr not actionable according
to whether his inward motive was selfish or unselfish for
what he did.

i think t:,e inquiries to which this view of

the law would lead arc dangerous and inexoeient inquiries
for courts of justice; judges are not very fit for them, and
juries are very unfit.

i think, therefore, that Lumley v.

Gye, should be overruled."

In the case again, however,

logic and sound reason wce-'e overcome by votes, and so the
conelusions of Lord Chief Justice have passod into

iistory,

not as an aut'o-itative exrposition of the lavbut merely as
the individual orinion of a dissenting judge.
effect of these tWo cases is t'nat,

The result and

in Lnglish law, where the

-10-

decisions are of biniCing force,

cto
whereby ho ca., be comrolle,

it

does

-- -!sor

i

imro~e U:on him --

not

in-

not a yarty t

rose a positivo oblirration it:on a person v:A:- is
it

oce

,.hile a cont-act

act or thing, yet

a'

,

a

of

eC

which 1-ic nust refrain from doin g t-iJ.!ngs vhich he might otherwise do freely; that is,

he must resr~ect the co::tractual tie

and not int,;rmeddle t,,'cr:.7ith;
selfish motive,

he does so,

and if

he can be mulcted in

_'amagC

is

a res which is

the subject of ownershi-,

intargible and mettlphysical

as the meeting of Tinds,

...

:-ot merely

:ind or nature whatsoever,

will be I-rotected as owuner of the same.
vague,

In

therefor.

other words the obligation created by contract,
for personal services, but of any

from a

and the obliee
it is as if that

cont;ct,

.menti,

known in

the law,

wich brings a

contract into being, at the sane :.omcnt erecte' about such
contract a sort of invisible barbed-wire fence, within the
bounds of which no thir- rerson can venture save at his peril.
In

Lu ley vs.

Gye,

the court

ly limited the

princirle to the case of contraots for exclusive -ersonal
services.

in Bowen vs.

Kall,

the cont -act

o,_r -rocuring

the breach of wiich the §efc,-" ::t 'vcs vuc" was also a contract

-20-

But the reasoning of the court was not

for such service.

confined to such casce,

and the -rinci--lc as laid dovm by the
by Lord Chief Justice Color-

prevailing judges an: a-, o-,--ose

it

idge is applicable to the ,-Lhole field of contracts.
seems theref'-re,
the contract
goods,

:ould make -,o -iflerince whether

that it

were for personal services, for the sale of

for t-e -ayu._ cxt of rioney u.opon a promissory > ote,

promise to marryor any kind of cont-ract;
if

a third party interferes and procures

so maliciously,
passing,

it

a right

-f

ir any and all
a

action will lie against him.

may be of intrn-est to

no longer an open ques tion in

with unanimous app.roval
English law writer,

aid leaves

Tngland,

yet

it

R. Anson,
'illis

does not meet
That eminent

in his admirablo
an appar-

work on the Law of Contracts gives the doctrine

ently reluctant endorsement,

In

oetc that while Bowen vs.

even by loyal Britons.

Sir

cases

breach and does

Hall settles the :rinetylc of lD.Vr conclusively,
it

a

while the able ani brilliant

Sir Frederick Polloch characterizes the decision in Lumley vs.
Gye as"anemralous at best" and swallows it
if

it

were a bittc

edition, p. 277;

pill.

with a

r--ry face as

(See Anson on Contracts,

Polloch on Torts, p.

451).

L:mowlton's

And the doc-
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trine of Lumley vs. Gye hac been quostioned in
article
In

by

Law Qarterly

,,o
,,.E.Ormsby on
Reviev,

Vol.

'Iialice in
VIII. , p.

a very recent

the Law of Torts"
4

.

C11P TTK

I I.

The Attitude of the American Alit'o:,iies on the Question.

Having considered the English doct-inc,

next

'.

naturally inquire, what :position hive the American Courts
The right of action for enticing

taken on this question?

away a menial servant had, as has already,, ointed out, become
a settled princi.le of lax- lon, before the Americ-n Revolution,
and in a large majority of the states the doctrine seems to
have been received and aee-ert,'

a!

art Df our inhcritar.ce
and some of it
aood,

from the --=ther county,

ruh. of it

but all of which c-are i.

v.ithout questi~ni:,

or soundness under the -rotecti -

folds of

loom }no.n as the "CoIT :.n Lay:. "

This

(See WoochTvard vs.

Dunlap, 50 N.H.,

450;

Vashburn,

to its

3 Dnio,

same case, 22 Am.!Rcp.,

origin

i-t sacrvt heir-

-principle ha

generally recognize( that but a fci' leo. incited.

a

bad,

been so

ca.ses need be
3GO;

475,

Bixby vs.

and note

following; Noice vs. Bro:.-n, 3'
way Co.,

117 Mass.,

0;

TI.J.L.,

i).

ie vie come to the 7jbaar'

But

Anes vs. Rail-

of the English

QectiO

courts that a right of action lies for nalicious interference
with

.y

it to its full extent, others reject

discord; a few follow
it

in

others tahe a -osition, which is

and still

toto,

authorities.

Let us examine the rrincical
the leading case citeC as sxi:
Cronin,

)

F

(107 T.asc.,

in

Hall.

a shoe manufacturer,

ecided in

1871, whic

without justifiable cause,

cfendant

oot 'cts,

was held that he could recove-,

princi-clcin

v

as followis,-

enjoy the fruits anld advantages
try,

shill

and credit.

against competition;

who was

for, unlawfully and

inducing several si~oenacrs em-

ployed by him to bo'oaK their
It

upon the

this case the rlaintiff,

sued the

Probably

the En:lish doctrine is

ortin

was beFore the Th.glis> Court of A.:eal had pabsse
case of Boweri vs.

neither

about haalf-way between the two.

logical nor graceful,

Walker vs.

inharmonious

we find the American courts in

contract,

and leave lils service.

Tells,j.,

stating the

"Uvery one has the right to
of his own ente-- ise,

ilndus-

VE h.s _-,o r-irht to be -rotected

but he has a right to be

-ieefrou

malicious and

:anto-l

di-turbanco or annoyance.

interference,

t of comtetition,

If disturbance or loss come as a rc
the exercise of li'le rightp

othcr , it -s dam-l-.

-

or

absque

iniuria, unless some su: crior ri-ht by 3ont-%Pt or otherwise
is interfered vwith.

hIt if it

comes from the mrecly wanton
jiostificatiD§ of
-'itho.t
the

or malicious acts of others,

competition or the service of any interest or l:ful ruri:0ose,
And futhcr on in
it then stands u!on a difforent footing.,
ly
right of action for enticing
speaking of the gener alconcede'o
away a servant, he says, "It
this doctrine spr-n

-1ms sometimcs been supposed that

frori the English Statute of Laborers, and

was confined to me-wial service.

But we are satisfied that it

is founded 'iyon the legZl rigt c'eriveC from the cont-act,
and not merely

v on the relation of mastcr and servant; and

that it ay:.l_es to all contracts of elorlyment, if not to
He cites in su-L-ort of

contracts of every description."

,is view Lumley vs. Gye, and several old cases of one 1ind or
another where d='a-es ,-.:,re allowed for the i-;az.ton intorference of one person with tre affairs
slander,
etc.

of another,

as for examrle,

enticing wife to remain av.;ay froim her husband,

Eut in

all of the latter

cases,

it

etc.,

seers to the present

-i,

writer, the:-e can bc fo'Le

wrongful act a2s well.

--

not only a '7rougful niotive, but a

in an able article on 'The Boycott

as a Groun" for Damages" p,?.blished in 1887 (21 PL.Law Review,
509) Mr. Jo.n -K.Wiigorc, of Boc'to,...... of Wahor vs.
Cronin, says,-at rage

lO, that it "is a much1 quoted case,

and emphasizes a -istinction betw'.een a violent or fraudulent
interference and orfdinary
however,

orsuas ion.

and. hel,- that ovcn t''ulteful persuasion, vwhen malic-

ious, is actionable.

This, i venture to say, was incorrect.

Of the decisions cited therein
it.

The court goes further,

or this ipoint ntot one supports

The distinction ,-ust rest, not upon the quality of the

motive, but ulon the nature of the outw'ard act.

There is no

more persistent and yet no -.ore unfounded notion, than that
motive --- I do not say intention --- can become the turning
ioint of civil liability --- no notion more fitted to reverse
legal relations and to -:.ae chaos out of definite rrinciple."
In Dudley v-. Briggs, 141 Mass., 502 (1330), the
plaintiff had for several years published biennially a directory of Bristol County, and

.opa-ring
-r-

to issue another in

due season, when the -lefendant came upon the scene, represented to the patrons of the plaintiff that he ha-- .

urchased the

-26-

plaintiff's businer-',

and sold then a Ii-roctory boarii

same name as that usuai. y issued b,
for damages,
Waler vs.

invoh ing the aut&i

Cronin,

of those eases,
recover,

it

but

the

lai-ntiff.

rity of' Lwmley vs.

ailc the c~urt

.x:-res. d it

the

He sued
Gye and
al.7:roval

decided against the 7laintI f's r'i-ht to

becausc there was no actual conr'act bet.:Oe. him and

his .atrone.

And yet, he-e was :.ot only malice, but an in-

depcndent wirongful act, to wit, false representations :
The Suypreme Court of

Lorth Carolina in 1371 in

Haskins vs. Royster, 70 N.C., 011, ar2Yclied the doctrine of
Lumley vs. Gyc, to a case where the defendant induced several
Ucro-ners

that is, farm laborers worh ing land on shares, to

break their contract with
ruled the
Judge

Ihe plaintiff, and in so doin

-

over-

ecision of that enient jurist and able writer,

Albioi,:. Tourgee, in the lower court.

Rodman, J.,

who wrote the opinion, after stating that the princ.le is
settled that maliicious interfe-ence with a contract for persoal services is actionable, follows it with a sentimental and
rhetorical flourish, thus,- "It need scarcely be said that
there is nothing in this princirle inconsistent ,-:ith personal
freedom, else we should not find it in the laws of the freest
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and most enlightened

States in the world.

partially to every grade of service,
and best raid to the
and tende-cst

.ost homcly,

It extends im-

from the

and it

o t brilliant

sheltcrs our neare- t

domestic rol.tions from the interferenice of

malicious intermeddlers.

it

is

-ot derived from any idea

of rroperty by the one rarty in the

other,

but is an infererce

from the obligation of a contract freely made by competent
He then follows with an extensivG quotation from

persons."

the opinion in Walker vs. Cronin, which he heartily endorses.
In 1877 the question again came before the Supreme
Couft of' orth Carolina in Jones vs. Stanley, 70 N.C., 357.
The plaintiff had made a contract with a railroa2 company
of which the defendant was :resident and Superintondent by
which said company agreed to transport from v.rious points on
their road to

:.iorehead City, a large nunber of cross-ties,

which the plaintiff had contract.l to

lelivor in Cuba.

After

the contract had been partly performed, the defendant maliclously, and for the

ury-ose of injuryin- the ::laintiff, that
.nL -n
,
the plitif t

is, to vent a personal spite, refused as an of :icial of the
Railroad Company to complete the czntract.

The

-laintiff

sued him individually, and was allowed to recover.

Rodman,

-28-

J.,

the same judge who wrote the orpinio1 in Haskins vs.

Royster, after referrins to that cc-sc, dis-oses of this one

very briefly as follows,-

"The same reasons cover every case

where one perf'on maliciously i-sue
contract with a third person.
tracts for service.,

It

a:-other to brclaI

a

is not confined to con-

Vrhile t'ie :.rinci-le av stated in the

cases heretofore considerer' has been broad enough to cover any
kind of a contract, this is the first, and furthernore, the
only cse

where the principle has been actually applied to

a contract other than for personal services.

Be it said to

the credit of North Carolina, therefore, that, having adopted
the -rincirle, it

has haC the courage to apply it

logically

to its fullest extent!
The -osition thus tahen by the North Carolina court
is

in contramist- ne-i-en to that t-e3cn by the Supreme Court

of Maine in

I

rwood vs.

7ilIson, 75

right of action was dciie

the

225
"3e., (1883)

where a

l aintiff a-ainst the defendant

for inducing, with -ross malic,alK almost by actual cotion, the te!:ant of the rlaintiff
the lease of a
h'.elling
Louse,
of his orinion,

after a.:-UovinI

to bresaX his contract for
eters, J. , in the course

of Lumley vs.

Gye and Bowen
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vs. Hall as appileal to rei''ueO

eo!t-

advise allother to brei:. a contract,
for

sys

,-

"Arty man may

if it be not a contract

lie may use any lawful influence or

services.
srsonal

means to make his advicc pr-evail.
deems it

.

In such a case,

tho law

,-ot wise or practicable to inquire into the motive

that irs'izatc. the !Cr' icc.
not legally wrong."

1I1

rcrci-ctrr-y be morally and

But the learned. court fails to explain

why it is any more leally wrong to interfere with a contract
for personal service t .i it is with :any other hind of contract.

This position is almost ludicrously illogical.
In C7irley vs, AtL:inson, 1 South.Rcp., 034, the

Supreme Court of Floria in 1S87 chan-rd the personal service
contract shoe over to the otter foot, so to spesk, by holding
that a malicious interrercuce wvith a contra-~t whereby an
emyloyee loses his -osition, Sive. a right of action by such
emrloyee against the -rty

so

rfering,

it the English
if

doctrine be deeme' at all worthy of oaUroval which, however,
lust be
we de--y, thio cc
a clear application of the .:,
.
sauce for the -oose is

ac
law, for it is
olf s ing that "I:hat is

sauce for the _a._der."

Ft-ane to s ', the foctrino under :iscussion seems
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to have never been consi'7cred by one of the ;_tc.ling courts in
America, namely,

by t-.("

must be aue to the £

that
nact the 13.7-y('rs in

not had faith en-owh- in.
In

it.

a recent

.Yo- .

Court of

t.rincir:le

c--.e at

of the 7'in'7,1 nton cijar

this state have

to brn--

E-cci3.l

ewce Court,

a scrvz-.t
- h

-_

,o ,-

ovrrulec'Iaa

Tlicitly held in

never,

c
contract _oef

iTf't this "octrine, a!to

Iy ,_ov:ldc,

a..

-n

7

7-tr
710 .

1-1

the contract oD i7ervice
is

._for tort by in-

i can see

"Loei
o :ac

m

tee servant'

o c iti

"

the _eoason fo'

r0t-e cornon law,

'ffc','ent.
nr'

c

was more t--at of a slave.

the rule has

The

le contracts

"li....
-

o reason why

excc tion.

the oatal i.'ia.h: of th-a.tm'.
-t

I am not satis-

'_

nself lable

rc-n_

been ex-

,--,ccse
of --:o other

ducing its viol .ticn tv " rsuasisn.

with the

in the course

the courts of this state.

Th the reason of

servant

ion. Yfaltcr

syeahi-rc of the so-called conz.on lay.:- action for

thou-nh never

fied

--owing out

of a year or :o ao, a wvell

t- icz

Lloyd Smith, Justice of the,

e:-ticinr.

a:1 action under

7erm, ho ,:: cr,

consid ered and able o-:itton -.s delivered by

of 7-.ich,

-71 s

._t

1isi S
in

..

c'ti-_,.ol-:

ositri

civil-Zation

It is, at
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least,

a matter of -,rave

will ever bc sustaine'2

oubt whether

in

this state.

101).

17 N.Y.Sup., 204 (Doce.

this caso has recently boc
Reynolds vs.

U-verett,

that be the

2

such ri

RoOers vs.

Jud-c Smith'

Lvarts,

L.Y.Su>:.,
Yor

S06 (L%.rch,
courts,

it

may be as-

with confidence that the doct-ine of Lumn.ley vs.

which,

as we have seen, h:Cd its

founitain he-.f in
cis servant,

if

193).

seted

action for the enticing aar y

in

o

by the (;oeral Torm in

f,

of tle ow

'ht of action

Gyc,

the master's

will not meet with

any arrroval hero, should any amrnitious litigant

atteript to

have it aT:?1Idc.
But in tw-o recent cases in tLhe Court of Anweals of
Kentucky, the entire L;,n-lish dootrine as established by
Lumley vs. Gye and Bowon vs.

Hall has been squoarely u: for

consideration, aaCd h.s been disa::rovel

and rejected abso-

lutely and completely in two able ;rinions which,

it seems to

the -rresent writer, -lust co;nmend themselves as rorarlably
careful and convincing, to evC2rv earnest stuc,...nt who is iiapartially seehing for the tn-'e doctrine, without a -rrecolceived

rrejudice or bias either to the one viewY
The first

case wa-s Chw§ ers va'.

or the other.
7aldwin,
1F

S..Rep.,
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57,

which was decided Jany. 13, 1891.

The question before

the Court was whether a right of action would lie for maliciiously inducing a person, who had contracted to sell his crop
of tobacco to the rlaintiff, to break said contract.
answer was, ,s indicated, in the negative.

The

This was followed

which
just a week later by a decision in a caseAwas the exact counterpart of Lumley vs. Gye, being an action to recovr damages
for maliciously inducing the noted actress, Mary Anderson,
to break her contract to appear at the Masonic Temple Theatre
Following out the reasoning of the prior

in Louisville.

case, the court held that there was no logical distinction
between service contracts, and those of any other

nature;

that even the so-called common law action for enticing away
a servant had no foothold in that state, except so far as
provided by statute; and, therefore, that the plaintiff could
not recover.

(2oulier vs.

15 S.W.RoP.,

Mcauley,

60).

Turning to the law viriters, as distinguished from
judicial decisions,

v7e fin-7 here also a lac-

The English doctrine is
(se

r071Iiate-

Metoalfo,

effect by Judge Cooley

581); while it is vigorously

Cooley on Torts, 2nd

upheld by Lyne S.

in

of harmony.

Jr.,

the editor of the Central Law

Journal

a noto which he ap:;enA5 to the rcport of the case

in

of Chambers vs. BalAV'in (Cnnt.L.J., Vol. 32,
Bishop, evidently w ithout

p.

2175).

JIr.

haying given the matter much ser-

ious consideration, virtually m-,--ovos the Bn,-lish doctrine
(Bishop on No:-Contract Lao-, SeN. 13).

Aside from these

authorities there are sevmrul magazine articles which discuss the effect and ay
lK

tioi

ass ime at tne- outset that the

- tetri'.o, but as they

.octrine is good law, they throw

no particular light upon the present discussion.
3riefly to review the Americar authorities, then,
it will be seen that while 1torth Carolina on the one hand endorses the English view, Kentucly goes to the other extrome
and rejects it, while L1assachucetts and I,.haine may be said to
tah.e a position about -Lldwmr between the two and hold that it
is at least applicable to contracts for personal services.
It

may also be fairly inferred from Burgess vs, Carpenter, 2

Rich,
view.

S.C.,

7 (1370)

that that state would reject the English

And Jones vs. Blocher, 43 Ga.,

331, which is fre-

quently cited as supporting such view is purely a case of
master and servant, and therefore not in point.
The law in America may therefore be considered as

-34une-,ettlec,
ilfl
ence

With lPohars a sii-htcijit

tKF'~Y~trin

.ith

of a right of

contracts for r.er..o

of al thority favor-

fo- ,a licious interferfztion
,al

vi2s

oIlly.

CIAPT YR IV.

7hat is

the True Doctrine?

Should a right of action be allowed for maliciow

that the question is
morally,

a close om<,av1 a nice one.

and sen:t iment ally, prob ably,
The-re is

in the affirmnative.
in

must be adnitted

it

interference with contract or not?

the min'-s of the laymen,

the ans,.er is

that the law

t-I

naturally

iotion, esp,cially

a :cru12.'

17ill

compel

every

or suffer for not doing so.

-erson to "Imind his own busine-s"

But when wre come to analjrz

Ethically,

quiestion,

and test it

by the

application of fixcd legal nprinciples, we are almost inevitably frrce6

to ansv'e'

the cueption

us briefly consider the reasons
At the outset,
there is

any fraud,

Wrr

let us y t

decertion,

as a resnilt of which thc- intermciTlc,"

in

the neative.

this is

Let

so.

aside all cases where
or coercion,
oris-e:-esentatio,
roduces a b-each of the

Here tho'-e is

contract.

wrongful act.

not only rmalice, but a ooncofco ly

Here the br,-ach is not the voluntary act of

the party to the contract, but

i

real

is overcoac

by the deception or co~reion DE' the thir' Tarty.
are clearly 'istimgisc- from the one n,1er

Such cases

iscussion

and

a right of action obviously lies against the iuron- doer-

385;
3"

(Benton vs. Pratt, 2

el-.,

Yet,

these t:o ea 's

curiously enough,

Rice vs. Manley, 68 1.Y.,82)
are to be Found fre-

quently cited a- suI -- orting the English doct--ine of Lumley

vs. Gye,

and Bowen vs. Hall,

..o. in fact they do not do so

at all.
Z

t th--Ic

quOst i o'

whi

-

,

"

.

ir

-

r

Igi.ht

the rnere truthful persuasion of one 7 .rty to a contract to
break it, if malicious, is actionable.
Coleridge, J-,

As pointed out by

in Lumley vs. Gye, if the yersuasion be fr'om

good urotives, tie interfe"enco is clea-rly not actionable.
But whether the motive be -oof or b--..,
same in each case.

the outward act is the

Hence if in one case the act is niot

illegal it cannot be i"lzin

othe- ca,

plain then that the ba-7nd maliciois .. .,

either.

it is

the inward and

secret workings of the mind, nmust bc the test as to whether

pivotal quec2tion around

The

the action shald lieor not.

which the whole matter revolves is, therW.fore, can a man be
made to answer in a coodt of law sloly for a bad motive?
Right in

this connction

intoresting
ti

atiso might be

written uron the evolution of the (loct-r'ine of malice in the
law of torts, but si-ace,of com-e,will not .memiit.
it

to say that iy the ew.ly

mentary affairs,

dlisiuItes,

rthe -ourts were rudi-

and v'7hon the iwries

neighbors who were

called in

Suffice

ooe co,.iosed of the

to settle local quarrels and

the good or ba- motive

wit.
hich am.

was alwa:ays the chief object of inquiry.

act was done

2 ut as civilization

has progresse!., and the Iresent syste-a of juris!-.rudcence began
to shale itself, the constant tendency has bee-, to measure
legal liability

and rcs yonsibllity by exte...... al standards,

rather than internal rur: oses.

Courts have recog1nized that

they 7ere finite,

fallible,

anr

ju .gments of motive

thecrefore,
alo-.e

motive will

135).

that attempted

often be w.rong, and were
:old

therefore dangerous. (fce Article on
Torts, 6 N.Y.fnr.Assn. ,

ar.

.lice

The

as an Elerient of

'1rincilplethat

a '"ialicious

.ot transsform an act, othe-'wisc iavful, into a

legal wrong has been fremit ly

...
li,,

in other classes of

-. '--

oases.

Thus,

diversion,
own lan

by the

oefenant,

ercise of a l:vful right,

Wilsan,, 23

39;

is

being an ex-

rot actioable.

Phelys -s.

Forzier vs. >own, 12 0.St. , 294;

Vt., 40.

willful

of subteranoouc water on his

of the ylaintiff,
.djoining
lands

from

72 N.Y.,

eld that a nalicIot s aT

has been

it

An,! the sa e

e

1

Nowlal,

Chatfield. vs.

incinle is sus-

tained by the decided weight of authority throughout the
United States.

Adler vs. Fenton, 24 F.ow. , .412:

Benjamin vs.

Je-nins vs. Fowler, 24 Pa.St., 308.
Wheeler, 8 Gray, 410;
In the latter case, Mr. Justice Jreriiah S. lack, thus aptly

expresses the doctrine,-

1 alicious _'otives mare a bad act
"'

worse; but they cannot mak:.e that wronZ nhich, in its on,:I
17 en a creditor who has a just debt
essence, is lawful.
hh ice jsit deto
,
brings a suit or issues exection, though he
pure enmity to the debtor, he is safe.

oes it Out of

in slanders, if the

defendant proves the words s okeni to be true, his intention
to injure the -laintiff by proclaiming his infamy, will -ot
defeat the justification.

One

:ho

osecutns anotho

for a

crime need not shoo,

in an acticn for ,alicio-s rrosecution,

that he was actuate

by correct feelings if

he can :rove that

trgeS well founfied.
there was good reason to believe the cha-

In

s"-ort,

if!

any transaction which woulc

the parties V-er

friends,

be iaw-ful and rro-e'r

cannot be r-c!

the foundation

of an action me-ely because they ha: en to be enemies.

lon.

a.

a man hecss himself wihin thue l] v: by

which violates it,

we irn st leave his

As

moins nn act

:otives to him who

searches the heart."
11allcu,
any unla.ful act,

reve-ne,
c-n-t

ani

s-cite, vrmen unaccomrpanied by

be consife--o (i

of law v:ill redress; unquestionably
but the
out in

v2on s which a court

they are vrong morally,

punishment for such wron-s can only be safely meted
the final judmaent day by the All-wise and Infallible
The allowance to any man,

Judge.

or set of .en, of the right

to judge by wh-,t interaral pirrose action is,

in

a given case,

controlled, places in their hands a dangerous engine of
and it

is

the ;yolicy of the law to lit,-rather

ower,

than increase,

such authority.

But there are ot.r reasons ,why

this right of action

should not be cranteC.

One of therm is,
contract,

that when tw.o

r_--ties

enter into a

each loolrs to thae oh',and only to the other for

any da ages that

iay result from a ......

of the same.

If

-40A.,

after having :'aac'e a contract

'

7t
B., had a right to erect

a high stone wall around 3. , and
he

him shut in
her

there until

had' carried out his -,art of the cont, act, then there

might be some roason for -ivin- A. . rizht of action against
C. for lea--ing over such wall anK ashtinB-, to de2art from
the enclosure before he had comleted the contract.
such right exists.

C.,

But no

after B. has made his contract with

A., has just as much right to tal. v.ith him as he had before;
and if he t-alhs of the contract and says something which
causes B.

to mcgLe up his own mind to brea: the contract, the

the breach is

clearly the act of E.,

and E. alone should be

held responsible.
Further, A's -rirht to sue and -recover from D. his
damages for the breach of contract is everywhere recognzezd
and admitted.

Now, if he also has a right to sue C. , it, in

effect,gives him two causes of action, one in tort and the
other in contract, for -:reciscly the same d-amage.
as the two causes of action are entirely distinct,
no reason

w1:T

the glaintif f

s-io-,Ai

be co

Ofellc

Inasmuch
there is

to elect be-

tween them, and the fact that he had recovered in one action
would be no bar

to the other action; the obvious result of

this situation woul

be,. t 2 ;e'fore,

recover fouble co-.nT en-ti:n
state of affairs it
plaintiff

the contract;

and in

for his injury.

uculd be a

to hamre sone

that the rlaintiff

itsid,'

3,.aliciolisly intorf"ere with

this a ,e of schei- in-

't-orrelin/

fellow citizen,

for the

-ith

Under such a

ositive advant age to the

might be troatefl to the sectacle of ro
cdeliberately

could

a:

-- ight financier

h-.
hs'toa_-i

xyrers

-,.rtifice, we

and revengeful

rTros

of rovoYing him to

a malicious interfe-ence with the cont' actsof th.e former,

in

order that he might reap his double ds0mages as a result
thereof.

But y erb:-ys it may be urged in defense of the

English doctrine that double compendation in
trary to the yolicy of the
action would be a bar to
be admissible in

w,
a

and that

recovery in

evidence to -ecluce

damages is

rrecovery in
the other,

d.nages in

over the other?

one

or would

the other.

If that be so, how shall the matter be aynrortioned?
judgment shall have -reference

con-

71ich

Shall it

be

left merely to the carrice of the plaintiff as to w-hich
bofng
action he shall --

first?

These suggestions

are suf-

ficient to show some of the fallacies of the English doctfine,
and where it

would le-ad to,

if

afopted.
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Finally,
Lumley vs.
them,

we must ro-a,,Iiate the entire doctrine of

Gye and 2owen vs. Hall,

anl the cases following

as being contrary to the spirit and customs of our

times.

Even the old action by the master for enticing away

his servant has outlived its
indicated by Mr.

purpose and its

Justice Smith in Rogers vs.

usefulness,
Evarts,

as

ante,

and would have long since been swept away as a relic of
slavery and of barbarism,

were it

not for the conservatism

and tenacity with which the courts cling to established precedents.

The most extenuating thing that can be said in

favor of its retention is that it has been used as a sort of
peg on which to hang the very righteous cause of action by a
parent for the seduction of his daughter, and Ierhaps this is
enough to entitle it to toleration in its present state of
comparatively

"innocuous desuetude."

But to any attempt

to extend it beyond its nar-row confines, as the English
authorities have done,
opposition.

there is

This is the age of freedom

son, freedom :f thought,
business.

every reason for d-etc-rined

freedom of' s:peech,

freedom of peranr

freecom of

Tie have advanced from the era of statut

to the

era of contract, and the spirit of competition is recognized
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and encouraged on every side.

To concede this cause of

action is

to foster,

tent,

to hamer this

irit,

the sTyirit of .-,oio-oly,

to a certain ex-

and to rlace iiccalle2

for

limitations upon lejitimate business rivalry.
The conclusion of this sreculativB fiiscussion is,
therefore,

that malLcious

intereoence with contract,

unaccompauied by f'-od, false rer"rseritations,

when

or coerbion,

is not a legal wrong for which an action will lie.

And a

fitting end is to be found in the following quotations from
the opinions of Lewis,

J.,

of the Kentucky Court of Appeals

in the two cases Treviously referred to, 15 S.f.Rci., 57, 60.
"Competition frequently engenders, not only a
spirit of rivalry, but enmity; and, if the motive influencing
every business transaction that may result in injury or inconvenience to a business rival was made the test of its legality,

litigation and strife

necessarily

increased,

would be vexatiously and un-

and the sale and exchange of commod-

ities very much hindercd. "
"It

is

not the -olicy

discourage comp- tition

in

of the law to restrict

any business or occupation,

concerning propeety or personial service,

or
whether

there being -o

good

-44-

reason for making more stringent regulations, in respect to
the latter, except where some one of the domestic relations
exist, thar the former; for if, in ordcr tc have sale and exchange of property fzree and unrestrained,

a person

anay law-

fully arid without legal inquisition of his motive, buy what

another offers for sale, and has a right to sell, it is no
less just and expedient that,

in order to have fair reom~ner-

ation for labor, a person be allowed to hire the service of
any one sui juris who offers to be hired.

And in every

case, the employer shoulC be required to look alone to the
person employed for bteach of the contract, just as the
seller must look to the buyer, and the creditor to the debtor,
in default of payment; for t. enforce a doctrine making the

hirer responsible for bteach, by the person hired, of a previous contract with another involves legal recognition of personal dominion,

bordering on pure servitude,

which is neither

in harmony with our form of governnent nor well for those
who labor for subsistence.,'

